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“The truth, if it is to be believed, must be
authored by those who have suffered its
consequences.” – Michael Ignatieff[1]
“Truth... is itself a representation” – Ed-
ward Said[2]
Chechnya was catapulted to the world stage in 1994 when Russian
troops invaded Grozny. Jokar Dudayev, the first president of inde-
pendent Chechnya, had announced Chechnya’s independence years
earlier and refused to sign a treaty which would tie him to the Russi-
an Federation, but no one paid attention to his declarations of inde-
pendence until Russian bombs leveled Grozny with more than sixteen
times the air power used by the Serbs during the siege of Sarajevo.
Russian and Western journalists flocked to the new war zone. Freshly
emerged from its Communist cocoon, the Russian state did not make
any effort to stem the flow of mass media representations of this as a
dirty war.
‘Chechnya’ became a symbol of anti-colonial resistance to imperi-
alist might as Chechen freedom fighters captivated journalists around
the world with their courage, muscles, and urban warfare. The war-
torn republic became a Western bourgeois utopia where freedom-
loving mountaineers lived and died for what they believed in. During
the first war, from 1994-1996, reporters around the world united in
singing the praises of the Chechens, offering them up as an example
to other nations struggling for freedom and sovereignty. To awed ob-
servers, most of them Western journalists, Chechnya was not only a
success story, but an allegory for the meaning of life.
Then the second war came. A series of bombs exploded in Mo-
scow apartment buildings, Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev
invaded Dagestan, and Moscow responded with air strikes many
times harsher than those used during the first war. The difference
between the first and second war lies not only in the greater degree of
brutality the second time around, but also in the nature and extent of
media representation. If the first war was overreported and
overexoticised, the second war was underreported and almost en-
tirely forgotten, even by Russians.
Ten years later, the Chechens have no sovereignty, romantic ac-
counts by Western journalists have given way to sober analyses by
political scientists,[3] and the war continues, taking ever more insidi-
ous, underground forms. What went wrong? Why did the West so
easily overcome its infatuation with Chechnya’s struggle for freedom?
At what point did admiration for the freedom fighters give way to
boredom and disaffection?
Just five years ago, Shamil Basayev was praised by Western journ-
alists as a fighter for freedom. Now, he is written off as an internation-
al terrorist by commentators on all sides of the political spectrum.
While Basayev’s radicalization is beyond doubt, the question to ask is
how did a struggle for freedom and self-determination become as de-
based as the Russian colonial conquest in the nineteenth century? This
question has been considered many times over from the perspective
of political, social, and historical reasons. The significance of media
representations is often asserted but rarely explored. Clearly, media
representations can foment hate, but what about more subtle reac-
tions, such as ignorance, complacency, and helplessness? In this art-
icle, I will explore these less visible reactions and the imagery that ac-
companies them. It is my belief that there is a relationship between
the degradation of the Chechen resistance – particularly its shift from
a secular struggle for independence to an entrenched battle driven by
money and guns – and the representations of their struggle which
have gained currency in the West.
Etymologically, representations imply a distance from the original,
their humble status in the realm of repetition. On the other hand, as
Edward Said points out in the above epigraph, there is no truth that is
not itself a representation, for truth by definition represents itself.
This is an ontological necessity, not an accidental association. Repres-
entation is thus both false (in the sense of far from the original) and
real, if true can indeed be considered the opposite of false. If reality
originates in representation, as Said’s words suggest, then the truth or
falsehood of a particular representation matters less than its political
import, or at least the two categories belong to an equal plane of signi-
ficance. Thus, the scope of my endeavor is to examine not so much the
real-world context of war representations as their political meaning.
I will limit myself here to analyzing the internal dynamics of rep-
resentations by Western and Russian sources, rather than attempting
to write a history of the entire Chechen conflict. The theories of rep-
resentation which I outline in this article inevitably remain in the
realm of hypothesis. I will restrict myself to texts and their theoretical
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implications. I believe that an analysis of ideology provides the best
point of departure for understanding the problem of representing
war. We must begin by stepping back from the frontlines and exam-
ine our categories of representation, our stereotypes and imagination,
our mistakes, clichés, and truisms. Particularly when the object of rep-
resentation is little known, expectations dictate outcome; the ostens-
ible subject matter is often a mere medium for prejudice, politics and
exoticizing projections. If we desire more informed and responsible
representations, our first task is to revise our categories of perception.
My purpose in bringing up the example of Shamil Basayev is to
suggest the narrative trajectory of the West’s romance with Chechen
freedom fighters. In the context of war journalism on Chechnya, ad-
miration for the other is often founded more on ignorance than know-
ledge. Such ignorance is neither blissful nor merely naïve; it has real-
world consequences. Concentrating on this example, I argue that it is
no accident that the representation of the Chechen wars in Western
journalism has reproduced the trajectory of Basayev’s own politics.
Representations produce politics as much as they reflect them. To
test my thesis, I will explore in the following pages the connection
between politics and representation in the work of the Russian journ-
alist Anna Politkovskaya, the Russian ethnographer Valery Tishkov,
and Western journalists. Finally, I will suggest ways of creating
modes of representation which probe deeper than the one-
dimensional images dominant today, even among well-informed
journalists and scholars.
I view the journalists whom I discuss here more as composers of
texts which can be classified according to various modes of represent-
ation than as individual authors. The purpose of my critique is not so
much to discredit or praise the writers as to examine the problems
posed by the genres in which they write.
ETHNOGRAPHIC AUTHORITY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF OBJECTIVITY
Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (1998) by British journalist
turned scholar Anatol Lieven is widely considered to be the most au-
thoritative account of the first Chechen war. One contemporary re-
viewer argued that “Anatol Lieven has written a book of great im-
portance for understanding not just the Chechen conflict but the en-
tire course of post-Soviet politics... it is one of the most important
books on post-Soviet Russia.”[4] Another reviewer in the influential
academic journal Central Asian Survey wrote of Lieven’s book that it
“is quite simply obligatory reading for anyone desirous of
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understanding the problems of Russia today and interested in its
likely destiny.”[5]
Lieven’s book is broad and ambitious in scope. As the title sug-
gests, it argues that Russia’s defeat during the Chechen war marks the
decline of the Russian empire. Perhaps inevitably, the author’s expert-
ise is in Russian politics. (The same could be said of nearly every re-
porter and commentator on Chechnya.) The limitations of such intel-
lectual horizons are evident in the preface that frames his book.
Lieven writes, “For a non-Chechen outsider, the underlying reasons
for developments within Chechnya are habitually shrouded in several
layers of opacity: anthropological, religious, and indeed criminal.”[6]
Thus, Lieven’s opening statement on the Chechen war suggests three
keys to unlock the Chechen character: anthropology, religion, and
crime.
Following Lieven’s cue in the section of his book devoted to the
Chechens, I will examine the use made of the first “key”: anthropo-
logy, or what James Clifford has called “ethnographic authority.”[7]
In the pages that follow, I trace Lieven’s manipulation of authoritative
ethnographic discourse to “master” the Chechen people.
Lieven notes in his book that when he was living in Chechnya
during the war, he lacked the “deeper anthropological insights” that
he gained afterwards when he had the opportunity to read more
broadly in the anthropology of primitive peoples.[8] If before his en-
counter with anthropological texts, Lieven was inclined to understand
Chechens in merely human terms, ethnographic authority provided
him with a more useful account of Chechen society. In his ethno-
graphic account of the Chechens, Lieven draws on his reading in an-
thropology to compare the Chechens on their culture and traditions to
the Berbers, the ancient Greeks (Spartans, Athenians, and Homeric
heroes), Native American Indians, Roman warriors, and the Zulu
tribes of southern Africa, all in one chapter. Like the Chechens, all of
these societies are for Lieven, and for much of his intended audience,
a priori primitive, “semi-tribal” warriors, and “loosely ‘anarchist-
ic.’”[9]
What is most stunning in Lieven’s account is the extent to which
ethnographic discourse allows him to write of a people he lived with
intimately for two years as though their individual identities were en-
tirely determined by the mechanics of history. Consider, for example,
the following set of truisms, quoted by Lieven and taken from
Anthony Wallace’s essay “Psychological Preparations for War” in a
book whose title testifies to the “policy relevance” of anthropological
discourse – War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression.
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Lieven uses Wallace’s words to explain the origins of the Chechen
war:
All human societies, and the societies of many of the higher primates below
man, are observed to exist alternately in two states [Wallace defines these
two states as “relaxed” and “mobile”]... a people with [a certain kind of]
character type will respond with anger, determination, fear, or whatever af-
fective state is desired by the communicating group.[10]
Beyond the scientific jargon, the meaning of such statements is not
difficult to decipher. National groups can be assigned character traits
and relied on to behave in predictable ways. Though mentality-based
arguments such as this one seem inadequate in most scholarly con-
texts, psychological dialectics are more acceptable when applied to
“primitive” ethnicities. Representational categories which would be
outlawed in most humanities discourses are adopted in political sci-
ence and journalistic discourse (Lieven’s book is a merger of the two
genres) as de rigueur. Descriptions of ethnic conflicts thus become en-
meshed in a neocolonial discourse founded on the inequality between
the object of representation in, for example, literary criticism (families,
individual consciousnesses, the mores of “developed cultures”) and
the more primitive subjects of the “harder” sciences. Thus, tribal na-
tions like the Chechens are reduced to a single character type and
analyzed by military strategists when they wish to predict how the
natives might respond.
Lieven views the Chechen experience of war as a disengaged out-
sider. His impression of the Chechens is a case study in the aesthetics
of exoticism. Lieven writes, “I have come to look on the Chechen
people” – note the use of a collective noun – “almost as on the face of
Courage herself – with no necessary relation to justice or morality, but
beautiful to see.”[11] It is perhaps not accidental that such admiration
is coupled with a readiness to dismiss the Chechen people from the
modern world.
Lieven’s representation of the Chechens at war can be product-
ively analyzed as an ethnographic encounter. In his recent book on
Chechnya, Valery Tishkov, director of the Institute for Ethnology and
Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences and former Russi-
an Federal Minister of Nationalities, calls the following concluding
passage from Lieven’s chapter on Chechen society “anthropological
reductionism.” Lieven tells us that
[the Chechens] are a nationality having no identification with the state and
society in which they live, and no motivation whatsoever to conform to its
laws; equipped with ancient traditions which are in contradiction to those of
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‘enlightened,’ ‘pluralist,’ and ‘progressive’ liberalism; with social forms
which make them opaque to outside investigation; internally cohesive, and
remarkably efficient and ruthless in pursuit of their aims. One might almost
say, to adapt a phrase of Robert Musil’s, that if the modern Western bour-
geoisie could dream, it would dream Chechens.[12]
What makes possible such a simplistic treatment of an entire culture
in a book which draws on a range of Western scholarship and openly
alludes to postcolonial analyses such as Edward’s Said Oriental-
ism?[13] Lieven’s writing is but one example of an entrenched and
systematic mode of discourse that extends far beyond the Chechen
wars. This is the discourse of ethnographic authority which enables
one-dimensional representations of the ‘tribal’ other.
Contemporary jouralistic descriptions of the Chechen ‘nationality’
read as though they were lifted from Evans-Pritchard’s 1940 book, The
Nuer (1940), an ethnographic account of this indigenous ethnic com-
munity from the Sudan. Consider the following quotations from
Evans-Pritchard, which apply the grammatically singular ‘is’ to a
plurality of people, as though all Nuers comprised a single, indivis-
ible unit:
The lack of governmental organs among the Nuer, the absence of legal insti-
tutions, of developed leadership, and, generally, or organized political life is
remarkable.
The ordered anarchy in which they live accords well with their character, for
it is impossible to live among the Nuer and conceive of rulers ruling over
them. The Nuer is a product of hard and egalitarian upbringing, is deeply
democratic, and is easily roused to violence. His turbulent spirit finds any
restraint irksome and no man recognizes a superior.[14]
Chechens under the Soviet Union were bilingual, educated and indoc-
trinated into the tenants of Marxist-Leninism to the same extent as
any other Soviet citizen. While Evans-Pritchard’s characterization of
the Nuer is paternalist and ethnocentric on its own terms, such a de-
scription applied to contemporary Chechen society is nothing short of
absurd. Certainly, Chechnya was and still is a largely rural culture,
and Chechen traditions have been preserved to an unusual extent
compared to the cultures of other minorities of the former Soviet
Union, but the generalizations offered by Western journalists are at
best applicable to a particular period in Chechen history (long ago)
and a particular part of Chechnya (far away).
The ethnographic account of the Chechen people in terms of
“stateless anarchy” and “military democracy” may have a basis in
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reality, or may be the product of creative myths, as Tishkov claims. Of
greater relevance than the “truth” of their particular ethnographic
representations is the scientifically unjustified and politically motiv-
ated application of these clichés to a contemporary setting. The result
is an alliance between political power and ethnographic authority in
the Western journalistic representation of the natives.
Tishkov eloquently explains what is wrong with Lieven’s brand of
ethnographic objectivity:
The logic of such... neocolonial reductionism suggests a group that deserves
sympathy, support and protection. By citing poorly proved or even fictitious
data on the ways in which their culture differs fundamentally from those of
others, and by rejecting commonalities, this kind of anthropology creates
myths of its own.[15]
The immediate effect of “reductive anthropology” may indeed be to
elicit “sympathy, support, and protection” for an otherwise forgotten
group, but ethnographic reductionism reaches beyond that. The read-
er who encounters the Chechens through Western accounts may at
first feel sympathy for the “internally cohesive, and remarkably effi-
cient and ruthless” people, but ultimately the effect of his ethnograph-
ic essentialism is the opposite of what Tishkov predicts. The ethno-
graphic other is never the equal of the expert who writes him into be-
ing, and therefore the empty glorification of the Chechen people (and
particularly of the Chechen resistance) is bound to backfire. Not only
does the contemporary community of political scientists and journal-
ists from the West explain everything noble about the Chechens in
terms of their essential ethos; as Tishkov demonstrates, in this poli-
scientific discourse, Chechens’ failures are reduced to ethnographic
data as well. Tishkov quotes from two scholars of the Chechen wars,
whose views have gained wide currency in the West:
Chechens lack a tradition of suprafamilial political organization and in this
respect may be regarded, however unpalatably, as a premodern society. The
result has been a catastrophic social implosion that has engulfed all of
Chechnya, and within which the current war is merely the latest phase.[16]
Pace Tishkov, such characterizations of the Chechens as a “premod-
ern” “uncivilized” tribe ultimately do nothing to aid their cause and
are as harmful to the average Chechen as the Russian propaganda
which describes them with equal simplicity as a nation of bandits.
Western estrangement resembles a romantic infatuation; it has little to
do with love and everything to do with the emotions of the observer.
In “rejecting commonalities,” to use Tishkov’s words, an essential
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inequality defines relations between the journalist and the native; eth-
nography creates an otherwise nonexistence distance between the
viewer and the viewed. Clearly, the natives would be better off
without the Western version of love. The following quotation from a
recent review of a journalistic account on the Chechen war indicates
just how unhelpful the prevalent paternalistic attitude is for the vic-
tims of the war:
Any serious study of the Chechens simply has to pay attention to the way in
which raiding (now transformed into various kinds of organized crime) and
utter impatience of higher authority are deeply imbedded in their tradition.
Many of us who covered the Chechen War came to love the Chechens for
their courage, endurance and style [sic!], but unfortunately, this aspect of
their character simply cannot be downplayed in any serious or objective ac-
count.[17]
Chechen “courage, endurance, and style” is but the logical flipside of
the image of Chechens as a raiding and innately criminal culture. In
the above quote, the ethnographic discourse of Western superiority
usurps the authority of common sense and allows for a degree of sim-
plification when discussing the Chechen people which a journalist
would hardly permit when discussing more “developed” nations.
The stance of the disengaged outsider creates around itself a field
of objectivity that inhibits perception. Some commentators have mis-
taken the Western fetishization of Chechens for respect,[18] but journ-
alism that operates inside this tradition unwittingly underwrites a he-
gemonic point of view. While at times it may enable us to see through
the hypocrisy of official Russian rhetoric, it simultaneously forestalls
any attempt to protest bloodshed. The disengaged outsider leaves the
reader who wishes to resist genocide stranded in a sea of realpolitik.
Objectivity in this context is merely a way of separating the viewer
from the viewed. It does not bring us closer to suffering, to the truth
authored by the internal experience of war.
Every genre has its ossified structures and historically cultivated
blind spots. This paper is an argument for a more engaged and less
bloodthirsty form of war journalism, for a methodology of writing
about bombs, rapes, and the people who endure them in a way that
does not exoticize the experience of those who suffer or flatter the
self-congratulatory feeling of difference on the part of many readers.
War journalists must find a way not to be mere “packagers of brutal-
ity”; such a characterization is a gesture of despair containing its own
aporia.
Journalism, particularly war journalism, ought to seek political
change. At the very least, I believe that when journalists seek change
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without relying on regressive, colonial structures of feeling, they
make a difference both more immediate and larger in scale than any
critic or theoretician of representation (such as myself) can offer. The
British journalist Edmund Morel, for example, was instrumental in
ending the genocide of Africans in the Congo by Belgian officers at
the beginning of the twentieth century.[19] Even when journalism
cannot change a government’s policies and practices, at least it can af-
fect the hearts and minds of readers and citizens under that govern-
ment. A better-educated readership means a more responsible state
and a government which hesitates before waging gratuitous wars or
committing genocide.
Journalists have this advantage over academic theorists: their in-
tended audience is a broad circle of readers and their engagement is
with a subject in the flesh rather than a metadiscourse. I offer my cri-
tique of Western journalism on Chechnya not in the spirit of censor-
ship or to push for more academic forms of writing, which would
likely be less engaging if written with perfunctory hypersensitivity to
abiding by the “correct” representation. What I wish to suggest is
how journalism can represent the other while at the same time not
sinking into reductive dichotomies and becoming itself a packager of
brutality.
It is commonplace to criticize journalists for exoticism and sensa-
tionalism, and in the transnational context, few will be surprised to
discover that the lesser-known peoples of the world are frequently
portrayed in simplified terms. The war journalist is simultaneously
“embedded” and “alien.” Such an observation will contain no revela-
tion for the consumer of war journalism. Beyond critiquing the ex-
cesses of popular wartime representations, I would like to propose an
alternative mode of vision, another way of engaging with the trau-
matized victim. In the context of Chechnya, there is at least one wo-
man, who, even though an outsider, provides a more effective way of
responding to war than we have seen thus far.
THE ENGAGED OUTSIDER
The Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya offers a counterexample to
the borrowed ethnographic authority of Western journalism. Her ex-
plicit goal as a journalist was not simply to provide objective docu-
mentation but to incite political change. For her, the Chechens were
not entirely other, and her encounter with them does not fit inside the
frame of ethnography. For Politkovskaya Chechens behavior could
not be traced to their mentality, their “military democracy,” or “state-
less anarchy.” Politkovskaya related to Chechens as humans rather
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than a clan; she identified motives for their behavior in their social cir-
cumstances rather than centuries-old ethnographic data. She refused
to be merely reporter passing through a bloodbath, eager for footage
of dead bodies and rubble, before moving on to the next war. Her
books are the only journalistic accounts of the Chechen Wars which
romanticize neither Chechen nationalism nor the power of the Russi-
an state nor the authority of the journalist’s representation.
In the Western ethnographic tradition, such common ground
between the participant observer and the native is often a source of
despair for the Western observer, enchanted with the strangeness of a
foreign land. When the noble savage fails to live up to his innate sim-
plicity, the Western viewer is forced to confront a new, unwished for
aspect of himself. Levi-Strauss, for example, writes in Tristes Tropiques
of his disenchantment with the natives: “I had been looking for a soci-
ety reduced to its simplest expression. That of the Nambikwara was
so truly simple that all I could find in it was individual human being-
s.”[20]
Anna Politkovskaya suffered the consequences of her engaged
mode of reporting. She was arrested, abused, and fled into exile in re-
sponse to death threats.[21] On a more mundane level, her invitation
to speak at the 2003 Frankfurt Book Fair, where Russia was the guest
of honor for that year, was withdrawn at the insistence of Vladimir
Putin, who made her banishment a condition of his visit to Frankfurt.
She received numerous awards for her journalism in the West, includ-
ing by such mainstream publications as Time Magazine. However, in
Russia, outside a small circle of human rights activists commonly
branded fanatics, she was regarded with suspicion, even among Rus-
sia’s intellectual elite. (The Russian writer Tatyana Tolstaya is known
to despise her, and she was often accused of being in the pay of
Chechen rebels.)
Politkovskaya did not subscribe to the notion of journalistic ob-
jectivity. Nor did she attempt to penetrate the cultural essence of the
Chechen people. (As we see above, such diametrically opposed pro-
grams often go hand in hand.) She did not occupy the center of her
narrative nor did she erase herself retrospectively from her represent-
ations. Rather than occupying the authoritative space of the disen-
gaged outsider or the privileged space of the packager of brutality,
she was simply herself, a writer caught up in the process of
representation.
Politkovskaya emphatically disassociated herself from the genre of
war journalism. She rejected the label war correspondent because for
her it denoted a person who travels the globe for hotspots, in search
of stories and experience. In his introduction to the English translation
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of her book A Small Corner From Hell, Georgi Derluguian situates
Politkovskaya in a literary tradition extending from Tolstoy to Chek-
hov, in which the belletristic writer functions as society’s conscience.
The British philosopher Isaiah Berlin has described this facet of the
Russian literary tradition in the following terms:
In Russia, social and political thinkers turned into poets and novelists, while
creative writers often became publicists... no Russian writer was wholly free
from the belief that to write was, first and foremost, to bear witness to the
truth: that the writer, of all men, had no right to avert his gaze from the cent-
ral issues of his day and society.[22]
While contemporary Russian culture is for the most part shaped by
Western postmodern skepticism and the economic imperatives of the
market, Anna Politkovskaya was one of the few Russian writers to
draw her inspiration from this tradition. She called the genre in which
she wrote “the journalism of action.” This form of journalism aspires
to effect political change, not merely to dissect the latest atrocities for
a bored public. As Berlin’s remarks suggest, this genre did not by any
means originate with Politkovskaya but is rooted in a rich, if currently
neglected, Russian tradition.
What does Politkovskaya’s participatory thinking look like on pa-
per? What textual strategies does she use to make a difference? First,
she reads language literally. The manipulation of language through
euphemism is the target of many of Politkovskaya’s critiques. She in-
sisted that political leaders said what they meant rather than what
they would like their audience to hear. When they refused to speak
directly, Politkovskaya “translated” their words into common speech.
Finally, she adopted a dialogic position in relation to her subjects and
audience. Her consciousness inevitably filtered what she saw and
wrote, but she did not cross herself out as a participant in the events
she wrote about. Towards the end of this paper, I will consider how
Politkovskaya’s dialogic voice might help us to conceive of a new
kind of intellectual, one who does not merely speak truth to power
but actually changes the discourse of the public sphere.
STRATEGY ONE: THE NAÏVE READER
For political change to occur, the linguistic assumptions of hegemonic
discourse must be overhauled. In this context, Politkovskaya’s repres-
entational poetics is the most salient aspect of her oeuvre. How did
she achieve, through language, the possibility of enacting political
change through representation?
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As a corollary to her engagement in material reality, Politkovskaya
was wary of the figurative abstractions of public discourse. She read
language literally, and even at times reapplied metaphors in ways
that made visible their true meaning. One of her favorite targets for
close reading was Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. Yeltsin with-
drew Russian troops from Chechnya in 1996 and signed a peace
treaty with the Chechen separatists, which granted the republic de
facto independence and officially ended the first war. More than two
years of relative calm in Russo-Chechen relations were shattered in
early September 1999, when a series of explosions in Moscow and
other Russian cities killed over 300 people.[23] While on the campaign
trail after Yeltsin’s resignation, Putin made a speech which galvanized
public opinion in support of another invasion of Chechnya. His most
memorable words were a promise to “waste the bandits in their shit-
houses,”[24] or, as some translations have it, to “flush them down the
toilet.” His words can be said to have inaugurated the second
Chechen war.
Politkovskaya applied Putin’s metaphor to a Chechen refugee
whose fourteen-year old son was killed by Russian troops.
Politkovskaya writes: “her son was... just plain ‘flushed’ in the literal
sense, by the direct hit of a shell into a village outhouse... [the soldier-
s] understood why the boy was going down the path to the far corner
of the yard, and they fired a shot. Just for fun, but at the same time,
fulfilling the direct order of their president.”[25] Unannounced irony
is the literary device at work here. Politkovskaya’s narrative persona
writes as a naïve believer in language’s surface meaning, as though
words were the building blocks of reality rather than tools manipu-
lated by political leaders.
Another example of childlike reading occurs in Someone Else’s War.
Toita, one of Politkovskaya’s informants, writes a letter on behalf of
families living in the Vedeno region, asking for help and protection.
Politkovskaya reports that Toita “sent this letter to the Russian and
Chechen government, then to the Russian Parliament, and finally to
MCHS, which saves them.”[26] MCHS is the abbreviation for the
“Ministry for Crisis Situations.” Clearly, Politkovskaya is using the
word “save” ironically here. Politkovskaya here equates the dou-
blespeak generated by officialdom with truth in order to defamiliarize
for the reader the commonplace lies of official discourse. War cannot
be explained in the terms of everyday life, so Politkovskaya resorts to
the filter of naïve perception to interpret for us the otherwise
uninterpretable.
In Politkovskaya’s hands, language is not only a receptacle of
meaning; it is equivalent to action. Putin’s promise to “waste the
18 spacesofidentity 7.2 (2007)
bandits” is wrenched from the sanitized and abstract context in which
the media has framed it. Often, tough talk such as Putin’s is attractive
only when its literal content is ignored. Whereas Western journalism
uses context to distance the reader from the subject, Politkovskaya’s
context is language, which she used to explore the impact of abstrac-
tions on everyday life.
STRATEGY TWO: FIGHTING EUPHEMISM
In A Dirty War (1999), Politkovskaya’s first book to appear in English,
she asks herself why Russian society is so silent regarding the second
Chechen war: “Where are the human rights activists? The intelligent-
sia, the conscience of the nation?”[27] Her answer indicates that the
state has silenced the nation and in effect won the war by manipulat-
ing language, euphemizing for the sake of deception: “There is a war
going on, but those taking part continue to be described as no more
than ‘participants of an anti-terrorist operation.’ As long as there is no
legal qualification of these events we shall pretend there is no
war.”[28] He who controls discourse determines the reality that dis-
course is supposed to describe. In contrast to the first Chechen war
under Yeltsin, Putin and his advisers delegated the task of represent-
ing war to themselves. The number of casualties and injuries for Rus-
sian soldiers has been documented by the group Mothers of Russian
Soldiers as three times larger than the official number, but, as
Politkovskaya points out, bodies matter less than words when it
comes to justifying war. An “anti-terrorist operation” excludes the
possibility of senseless bloodshed, and any evidence to the contrary is
easily discarded. Politkovskaya writes that “The information war has
been won, but... the battle for human souls has been completely
lost.”[29] Her words indicate that a hazy relationship between rhetor-
ic and reality is a precondition for a popular war.
The logic behind the state’s manipulation of language through eu-
phemism is brought out clearly in a chapter devoted to the impover-
ished condition of Grozny hospitals, where amputations are per-
formed without anesthetics and with saws instead of appropriate sur-
gical implements. Politkovskaya invokes again Putin’s “anti-terrorist
operation” and defines it in a way that would (or at least should)
make him shudder: “a punitive mission directed against one ethnic
community, which now requires hardly any more ammunition, just
the patience to wait for the inevitable outcome.”[30] The “inevitable
outcome” is, of course, annihilation.
According to Politkovskaya’s poetics, the purpose of euphemism
is to evade responsibility. Hospitals are not built because, according
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to the official media, they were never destroyed. It doesn’t matter if
bombs have exploded inside operating rooms, and soldiers enter
upon whim and shoot anyone who looks suspicious. Such is the logic
of euphemism which Politkovskaya points to when she writes: “It all
fits together. Why bother to rebuild if there is no fundamental need to
rebuild? Why feed people if there is no fundamental reason for them
to be fed?”[31] One of Politkovskaya’s most effective textual strategies
is to reverse the logic of euphemism; she counters the manipulation of
words with their literal content.
STRATEGY THREE: THE DIALOGIC ENCOUNTER
Politkovskaya’s writing is a challenge to falsely objective political dis-
course of both Western and Russian journalism. She argues that the
Russian public is able to “turn a deaf ear” to the suffering of Chechens
because “the war has completely ceased being personal and has
turned into several talking-head generals on the TV screen.”[32] Rath-
er than showing footage of war, the media has taken to interviewing
generals and other “experts” on the “Chechen problem.” In waxing
eloquent about security threats, terrorism, and territorial integrity, the
talking heads enable Russians to forget about Chechnya as a material
reality.
Politkovskaya assumes the position of an engaged outsider in her
writing, and thereby brings her subjectivity into the public sphere
along with the subjectivities of those she writes about. In the introduc-
tion to Politkovskaya’s most recent book Someone Else’s War, or Life Be-
hind the Barrier (not yet translated into English), her editor Svetlana
Gannushkina describes Politkovskaya’s discourse as one that goes
beyond objectivity:
In offering this book to the reader, we understand that it does not offer a
complete picture of everything going on in Chechnya. An objective analysis
of this war... is the business of experts and a job for the future. Politkovskaya
writes simply of what she sees and feels. Her writing shows us how to see and
how to feel.[33]
Politkovskaya's books are filled with vignettes from the lives of
Chechens and Russians living “behind the barrier.” She interviewed
soldiers and civilians tortured by those same soldiers. She did not
pretend to objectivity. Her biases are quite clear and frequently articu-
lated. Politkovskaya’s purpose, however, was not to propagate her
views. Her narrative focus and the burden of discourse lie with her
characters. In his book on Dostoevsky, the Russian literary critic
Mikhail Bakhtin argued that the dialogic thickness of any good work
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of fiction casts the author’s ideological conclusions in a sometimes
contradictory, but always subordinate light. He called this subversion
of writerly authority through characters’ speech and other contingen-
cies of novelistic discourse polyphony. Politkovskaya’s writing is
polyphonic in Bakhtin’s sense.
Unlike her fellow war journalists, Politkovskaya did not discuss
the appropriate way to deal with the “Chechen syndrome.” She did
not concern herself with Russia’s territorial integrity or any other hot
issue in the public sphere. Politkovskaya’s policymaking was medi-
ated by her politicization of the personal. The personal is in and of it-
self not a category worth valorizing, and it has its own empathetic
limits. Here, I do not use it to refer to an internal, as opposed to ex-
ternal, mode of perception, but rather to represent, however insuffi-
ciently, Politkovskaya’s resistance to regimentation. In relating suspi-
ciously to the old hierarchies and canned truths whose hegemony is
still largely unchallenged, Politkovskaya imported an individual vis-
ion into a discourse enmeshed in the illusion of its own objectivity.
The content of public discourse is itself determined by the interests of
those in power, so to limit herself to, for example, merely refuting the
stereotyping of the Chechen resistance as an entirely “terrorist” move-
ment would not be the most effective way to challenge such logic.
We have already seen how Politkovskaya adopted a defamiliariz-
ing and naïve tone of voice (often juxtaposed to a stringent critique) in
her refusal to enter the public sphere on the public sphere’s terms. In
place of policy relevant discourse, Politkovskaya offered a Bakhtinian
view of the author’s position vis-à-vis her audience and subject mat-
ter. Dialogism need not constitute a withdrawal from politics; it is but
a more complete engagement with the world. Though it does not
speak directly to the policy makers, it has a greater capacity to change
the public sphere because it is directed against the discourse that
makes war (and the prejudices supporting it) a tool inflicted by the
powerful upon the weak. Even a well-intentioned consideration of the
Chechen war via the interests of the state (such as we find in most
popular journalism) has the unintentional effect of consolidating state
power. Instead of this kind of concession, Politkovskaya presents us
with the possibility of participatory thinking.[34] This means thinking
as a mode of change, thinking thoughts which affect the reality we
observe.
Politkovskaya’s dialogic voice alienated her from her complacent
Moscow life. She countered journalistic objectivity with willed es-
trangement. Politkovskaya created a third space for herself, neither
wholly objective nor subjective, which freed her from the limitations
implicit in any form of monologic thinking. Politkovskaya’s stance as
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the engaged outsider allowed her to capitalize on the potential of all
aspects of her position. Politkovskaya rarely wrote about herself. In
her self-representation as an author, she lived a divided life. Her chil-
dren, her living conditions in Moscow, and her past were all utterly
irrelevant to the life she led in Chechnya. Describing her life apart
from the war, she writes, “even close friends don’t believe my stories
after my trips to Chechnya, and I have stopped explaining anything
and just sit silently when I’m invited anywhere.”[35] In a caption be-
neath a picture of herself in her office, Politkovskaya writes that she
does not consider her Moscow office at the newspaper Novaya Gazeta
to be her real home: “I’m there only rarely, and when I’m there I feel
out of place [kak to ne po sebye].”[36] Politkovskaya’s position in rela-
tion to the object of her representation recalls the words frequently
cited by Edward Said in defense of his own choice to live the life of an
exile: “The man who finds his homeland still sweet is a tender begin-
ner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but
he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign.”[37]
The flexibility of her writing self is in part indicated by her use of
pronouns. Politkovskaya’s second book of dispatches from the second
Chechen war opens with an account of crossing the border into In-
gushetia with a group of Chechens. Their path is obstructed when
Russian planes start to drop bombs on them. Politkovskaya points out
that the planes are flying at close enough range to make out their
faces, and that it is clear they are civilians making their way to a
refugee camp. The man with whose jokes she opens the book is killed
during this attack. Politkovskaya’s narrative differs from a typical
journalistic account of war in her refusal to distinguish between her-
self and the civilians: “we are lying on the autumn grass,” “we are the
people caught in the bombing,” “we didn’t do anything wrong” are
the first lines in the book.[38] The outsider versus insider dichotomy
relied on by Western writers dissolves here in the face of a tragedy
which gives rise to a new kind of representation.
In a chapter about the abominable classroom conditions for
Chechen children, Politkovskaya writes about the indifference of the
Russian administration towards their fate. Tellingly, she writes: “Rus-
sia has abandoned us again.”[39] Politkovskaya’s decision to elide
that distinction between us and them constitutes a refusal to perform
upon the Chechens the same genocidal calculus that Russia has per-
formed on them.
Politkovskaya, of course, did not follow the path of facile identific-
ation with the Chechen people. She recorded the many times that
Chechen children shied away from her simply because of her Slavic
exterior. Some ran away in terror, others were filled with hate. Of a
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four-year old girl whose father was raped and tortured by Russian
soldiers, Politkovskaya writes that she “stares at me with horror.”[40]
The girl’s mother explains to Politkovskaya that her daughter “can
tell you’re not one of us.”
Politkovskaya’s antagonistic relationship to her outside self keeps
the fear of inauthenticity at bay. Often, people writing about foreign
cultures and experiences alien to them define the limits of their en-
gagement with the subject by labeling themselves outsiders and as-
suming a resolutely disengaged stance. Such people would claim that,
because their engagement can never be pure, they might as well give
up the attempt. Sometimes such disengagement is motivated by a
conscientious fear of falsely representing another’s voice. At other
times, however, self-consciousness is merely a pretext for indiffer-
ence. Regardless of the motive behind the detached stance of the ob-
jective journalist, the effect is the same. Such writing sells itself to the
disengaged reader; reading an account of war from the perspective of
an outsider becomes a way of leaving the question of engagement
behind.
Of her three strategies of resistance, it is Politkovskaya’s self-
positioning as an engaged outsider that has changed the most from
her first to her second book. Though comprised of dispatches pub-
lished only two years before those in her second book, A Dirty War is
at times written from an ethnocentric Russian point of view.
Politkovskaya was always adamantly opposed to the Chechen War,
but her earlier work tended to highlight the Russian experience of the
war at the expense of the Chechen experience and her argument for
peace appealed primarily to Russian self-interest.
In his review of A Dirty War for the New Left Review, Tony Wood
criticizes the earlier Politkovskaya on the ground that her “freedom to
speak a tainted truth is meager compensation for lives lost and
ruined.”[41] Even while he calls her “one of Putin’s harshest and most
principled critics,” Wood believes that Politkovskaya’s writing is
symptomatic of a larger Russian tendency to see the war from a hege-
monic perspective.
As Politkovskaya gained more confidence as a writer, however,
her writing ceased to reproduce stereotypes. Perhaps also the length
and brutality of the Second War increased her skepticism and hostil-
ity to the Russian side and caused her to view the Chechen resistance
in a new light. Whereas Wood criticizes Politkovskaya in her first
book for grouping Dudaev, Basaev, and Maskhadov[42] into the same
camp, her second book opens with an encounter between her and a
man she meets in Europe, whom she informs that his house has been
destroyed by Russian bombs. Her friend is in fact Akhmed Zakaev,
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Maskhadov’s Special Representative to Europe, another man labeled
a “terrorist” by the Kremlin.
Perhaps Politkovskaya initially believed that she stood a better
chance of mobilizing the Russian population against the war by ap-
pealing to their self-interest. At the time, she may have been right, as
much of the Russian population was strongly against the first war.
However, in her second book, Politkovskaya neglected the politics of
expediency in favor of the politics of engagement. She sought to
shape her audience rather than cater to their prejudices. By comparing
Politkovskaya’s writing to more standard journalistic accounts, we
learn that the difference between politics and propaganda does not
reside so much in their relationship to the audience as it does in the
relation between the writer and her subject matter. The politically en-
gaged writer is herself shaped by her subject, whereas the propagand-
ist is axiomatically disengaged from the object of representation. Pro-
paganda’s self-representation depends on the myth of objectivity.
Ultimately, Politkovskaya’s talent for seeing with her own eyes
gave way to a less mediated vision, or rather the result of mediation
in Politkovskaya’s case is a richer, more complex mode of representa-
tion. Politkovskaya did not place the Russian reader between herself
and the Chechen people. Politkovskaya was in the end not a spokes-
woman for the Chechens, nor did she aspire to become an honorary
Chechen. Clifford Geertz writes in Available Light that “to discover
who people think they are, it is necessary to gain a working familiar-
ity with the frames of meaning within which they enact their lives.”
He is discussing here the task of the ethnographer in representing the
native. Politkovskaya’s journalism offers another strategy of repres-
entation: political engagement. Just as her politics made possible a
more complete knowledge of the other, familiarity enriched her polit-
ics. It is impossible to conceive of Politkovskaya as a writer apart from
her dialogic relation to her text and subjects. Her mode of representa-
tion belongs to the category of the engaged outsider, who creates
through language a new space for cognition. With Politkovskaya,
words think into being the reality of estrangement.
If A Dirty War is about the impact of the Chechen Wars on the
Russian people, A Small Corner of Hell chronicles genocide from the
other side of the barrier. The change in Politkovskaya’s stance is in-
dicated by the title of her third collection: Someone Else’s War, or Life
Behind A Barrier. The designation of the Second Chechen War as “-
someone else’s” indicates how deeply alienated Politkovskaya was
from the Russian side. Politkovskaya no longer positioned herself on
neutral territory. The Chechens had been cordoned off from the
world, and she moved along with them to the other side.
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REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE
Once the world has been rendered strange, there is no longer any firm
ground from which to issue a critique of any side involved in the war.
The starting point for critique must be created; no podium exists as a
given from which the engaged outsider can preach. How can a war
journalist make peace through representation? How can we perman-
ently restructure representations in a way that challenges the status
quo of war and make it more difficult for the disengaged to excuse
themselves from caring?
The range of representations of the Chechen conflict makes palp-
able the value of estrangement. Objective journalists who identify too
closely with official discourse lose their ability to separate themselves
from the sources of power they are supposed to critique. On the other
hand, those who ignore official discourse completely risk turning
themselves into packagers of brutality. Only the engaged outsider can
resist the lure of officialdom and represent war as something more
than a commentary on authorial consciousness. Politkovskaya’s work
enables us to perform a nearly impossible task; someone else’s suffer-
ing need not be subsumed in the act of representation. The disen-
gaged outsider is an estranged participant in the world she describes.
Politkovskaya did not consign herself to the world she wrote about;
she did not reconcile herself to its double standards and hypocrisies.
Instead, she participated in it with both distance and engagement,
and thereby worked to change it.
Academic critiques of ethnographic representations often neglect
to note that narrative interest, rather than reactionary politics, is the
prime motivating factor in simplified, sensationalized and overly
exotic representations. In critiquing a representation of the other for
its imprecision or incorrect assumptions, we tend to forget that cor-
rectness, including political correctness[43] and theoretical soundness,
are not the only values that make a difference. Without narrative in-
terest, a non-hegemonic representation of the other is of little value
because it fails to engage the witnesses, which, in the case of war
journalism, are the readers.
Often, when we redress the imbalance of power between the nat-
ive and the observer, the narrative interest of a text is lost because the
hegemonic assumptions on which it relied were the means by which
the reader recognized himself and identified with the author. Is it pos-
sible not only to be “representationally correct” but to write well? The
example of Anna Politkovskaya proves that aesthetics and ethics are
intertwined in writing. However, “good writing” cannot be reduced
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to a political formula. The aesthetics of engagement vary according to
the demands of time and place.
The canons of taste always benefit from revision. It is our job as
critics to probe and dissect the politics of representation, not simply to
reach a more accurate and informed vision but because representation
is the source of human action, the stimulus for war, and the condition
for peace. People – including politicians – act on what they see. To re-
phrase Said, truth is a sum of representations. The more representa-
tions a particular truth can accommodate, the more angles of vision it
responds to, the closer that truth comes to providing a political solu-
tion to the problem of war. Thus, it is possible, via a journalism of en-
gagement which encompasses not only the privileged outsider but
embraces anyone who wishes a different, better, world, to make peace
through representation.
The most common response to war, and this is equally the case
with war journalists, is to construct a theory for why it happened ac-
cording to the hindsight generated by a distant retrospective mode,
and to confine that analysis within the bounds of acceptable perimet-
ers. We compare one war to another; we consider various military ad-
vantages and weaknesses, but if such analyses make a difference,
their impact can only be to reinforce the dictum that might makes
right. Policy analysis rarely ends a war. It is hardly necessary to ar-
gue, in light of the genocides of past decades, that the old methods for
representing war – in other words, our imaginative strategies for con-
ceiving of the other – have failed us.
What would a more engaged journalism look like? Central to this
question is an investigation of the value of the category of difference
in a cross-cultural context. In his book, Lieven assumes that an ontolo-
gical gap divides the premodern Chechen from the modern Western
reader and from their Russian antagonists. Lieven does not intend the
“premodern” epithet to register pejoratively, but his label nonetheless
turns Chechens into an anthropological artifact. Obviously, this mode
of distancing cannot serve as a model for journalistic engagement.
Nor do I deny difference categorically, for it is a crucial aspect of
the way a war journalist positions herself. With Chechnya, as with
any other colonial or postcolonial situation, the erasure of difference
cannot be made in good faith, for that would deny the salience of the
power hierarchy which has structured Chechen-Russian relations. To
be sure, the lines dividing the colonized from the colonizers are often
blurred, the colonized sometimes collaborate with the state (consider,
for example, Akhmed and now Ramzan Kadyrov) and the colonizers
may align themselves with the colonized. But this does not affect the
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asymmetry of power. Even when difference is merely a social and his-
torical construct, it is inescapable and insurmountable.[44]
Thus, we cannot simply remove difference from Lieven’s account
and produce the true Chechen. Perhaps we can remove the Western
gaze, but we are still left with ineluctable and irreducible difference.
At best, difference is an invitation rather than a barrier. The invitation
is one that Politkovskaya accepted. In doing so, she extended the
boundaries not only of herself, but of the society in which she lived.
Let us hope that others will follow her example.
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